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Special International Zones in Practice and 
Theory 
Tom W. Bell 
ABSTRACT 
The French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had 
flown into the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport near Paris and 
claimed the right to stay as refugees seeking asylum. Unwilling 
to have the supposed refugees imposed upon it, France resolved 
to process their claims without letting them into the country. 
How? By keeping them in the airport’s international transit 
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from 
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance. 
This split border allowed France to summarily process and 
(typically) deport the foreigners while keeping them outside the 
country’s territory for asylum purposes. When detainees got 
seriously ill, France created so-called “floating international 
zones” to take them to a local hospital, a portion of which became 
a temporary international zone. These French innovations in 
border control inspired Hungarian transit zones, Australian 
migration zones, and similar partial territories across the planet. 
Few people beyond government attorneys and human rights 
workers have heard of that particular kind of special 
international zone, but most people know of the airport transit 
zone—an area where foreign travelers can catch connecting 
flights without going through local border controls and buy goods 
free of local customs, duties, or taxes. Research uncovers still 
other institutions that aspire to rise above merely local rules, 
including the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN 
laboratories. Each of these species fits within a more general 
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genus, the special international zone (“SIZ”): An area that its host 
nation state places outside of its territory for the purpose of some 
local laws, leaving other such laws and applicable international 
obligations in force. Special international zones already exist in 
great number and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and 
adapt. This article introduces SIZs as objects worthy of study on 
many counts, but most particularly because SIZs offer nation 
states a mechanism for selectively unbundling their territorial 
services in response to necessity, the constraints of international 
law, and promotion of the public good. 
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INTRODUCTION: NATION STATES BY DEGREES 
In 1992, at the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport outside 
Paris, the French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had 
flown into the airport and tried to stay as refugees seeking 
asylum. The government regarded the claims as bogus and the 
supposed refugees as mere economic migrants attempting to 
exploit a loophole in international law. Unwilling to have 
unwanted foreigners imposed upon it, France came up with a 
clever solution: It would process the supposed refugee’s claims 
without letting them into the country.1 
How did France work this bit of legal legerdemain? By 
keeping the foreigners within de Gaulle’s international transit 
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from 
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance, 
beyond which lies France proper.2 Exploiting this bubble in its 
border allowed France to summarily process and deport most of 
the supposed refugees while keeping them outside of the national 
territory for purposes of claiming asylum.3 Voilà. 
As the days dragged on, the French built accommodations for 
the foreigners within the airport’s international zone, forcing them 
to choose between staying within its confines or leaving the country 
entirely. That kept them safely outside of France’s territory for 
immigration purposes. Eventually, though, the foreigners suffered 
medical conditions requiring hospital treatment. So the French 
designated certain vehicles as floating international zones and used 
them to transport the patients to a local hospital, relevant parts of 
which they also designated as temporary international zones.4 This 
entire archipelago of fixed, floating, and temporary zones, specially 
created to allow foreign nationals to stay within the geographic 
borders of France but outside of its immigration or asylum 
territory, lawmakers called zones d’attente pour personnes en 
instance (“ZAPI” or “zones d’attente”).5 
This French innovation, turning international transit zones 
into extra-territorial pre-asylum processing areas, proved both 
popular and controversial. It rapidly spread to other countries, 
mutating in the process, giving rise to Hungarian transit zones, 
 
 1 See TUGBA BASARAN, SECURITY, LAW AND BORDERS: AT THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 
3 (2010). 
 2 Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile [Code of entry and stay 
of foreigners and of the right of asylum] art. L221-2 (Fr.) [hereinafter CESEDA art. L221-2]. 
 3 See BASARAN, supra note 1, at 50–64. 
 4 See id. at 59. 
 5 See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
298 (2005); F. Julien-Lafferrière, Le traitment des demanderus d’Asile en Zone d’attente 
entre théorie et réalité, 1238 HOMME & MIGRATIONS 32, 32–36 (2002). 
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Australian migration zones or excised territory, and similar 
devices in countries across the globe, under names such as 
reception area, transit area, or detention area.6 Faced with 
similar problems at sea, the United States declared its territorial 
waters outside the reach of national and international laws 
applicable to asylum-seekers.7 Some countries have even 
declared the decks of their ships extraterritorial zones, allowing 
them to rescue and return migrants without affording a venue for 
asylum claims.8 
The advent of this new species of institution alarmed 
commentators, who criticized the supposedly extraterritorial zones 
as fictional, illegal, and illiberal.9 Judicial authorities, in contrast, 
have gone no further than demanding respect for preexisting 
international obligations.10 Thus, scrutinized and somewhat 
tempered, zones d’attente and similar special international zones 
have come to play an important role in regulating the global flow 
of asylum seekers, economic migrants, and others seeking to enter 
unwelcoming nation states. 
Most people know of just one kind of international zone: the 
airport transit zone, where foreign travelers can buy goods free of 
customs, duties, or taxes and catch connecting flights without 
going through local border controls.11 Students of international 
law may have heard of still more obscure examples of nation 
states willingly rolling back their effective borders, such as they 
have done for the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN’s 
laboratories.12 In each of these and similar cases, such as the 
French zones d’attente, the same general pattern repeats: A 
nation state designates a portion of its geographic territory as 
outside the reach of some local laws, leaving local laws still in 
effect and preexisting international obligations unchanged. 
Given their shared features, growing practical importance, 
and common theoretical challenges, these legal institutions need 
 
 6 Boldizsár Nagy, Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization 
Instead of Loyal Cooperation, 17 GERMAN L.J. 1033, 1048–49 (2016) (discussing migration 
zones); Tugba Basaran, Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT AGAINST 
EUROPE?: SECURITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 63, 64 (J. Peter Burgess & Serge 
Gutwirth eds., 2011) (discussing other zones). 
 7 Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens’ Arrival in United States 
Territorial Waters, 17 U.S. OP. O.L.C. 77, 79 (1993).  
 8 Tugba Basaran, Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion, 2 INT’L POL. SOC. 
339, 343 (2008). 
 9 See infra Section II(A). 
 10 See, e.g., Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826 (holding that France could 
not unilaterally place part of its territory beyond the scope of Article 5, section 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pertaining to detention of protected persons). 
 11 See infra Sections I(A), II(C). 
 12 See infra Section I(E). 
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a shared name. The term “special economic zones” (“SEZs”) offers 
a model because SEZs also represent discrete areas where a host 
country applies unique, and usually less burdensome, financial 
and business regulations. Hence the term adopted for this article: 
Special International Zone (“SIZ”). 
Summarizing the examples to follow, this article defines as 
an SIZ: 
An area that its host nation state places outside of its 
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving 
other such laws and applicable international obligations 
in force. 
Special international zones already exist in great number 
and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and adapt. What 
does the future hold for SIZs? Perhaps more of the same—but 
worse. A country could take France’s example too far, for 
instance, creating special border areas and floating personal 
temporary microzones that together have the practical effect of 
keeping entire regions and populations outside the country’s 
national territory in terms of legal rights and privileges, while 
putting them firmly inside the territory in terms of police powers. 
Or SIZs might evolve in a more benign direction, creating 
refugee cities for homeless populations, “deep blue” zones for 
seasteads, or special international residency and work (“SIRW”) 
zones for digital nomads.13 All these and other options become 
possible once the general concept of a SIZ—a designated area 
outside the reach of some local laws but still subject to 
international obligations—has been defined, illustrated, and 
explained. If that appeals, read on. 
After this Introduction, Part I of the article surveys 
contemporary legal practices to discover SIZs regulating trade 
and travel across the globe through SEZs, international transit 
zones, duty-free retail areas, pre-asylum waiting areas, and other 
variations on the theme. Part II reviews the scant extant 
commentary on special international zones, especially criticisms 
of pre-asylum waiting areas, to develop a theory of special 
international zones under which they might redeem themselves 
as instruments of public policy. Part III applies that theory to 
describe some possible forms of future SIZs. The article concludes 
by explaining how special economic zones can promote the public 
good by providing a means for nation states, under the 
constraints of international law, to selectively unbundle their 
 
 13 See infra Part III. 
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services, by placing select territories outside the reach of some 
local laws by placing them within SIZs. 
I. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN PRACTICE 
This Part describes special international zones as observed 
in the field, so to speak, in the many places nation states have 
deliberately rolled back their powers, leaving a void filled by the 
governing influences of international trade, travel, and 
cultural exchange. The little-celebrated, but indisputably useful, 
international transit zone, described in Section I(A), fits 
squarely within the definition of a SIZ. Other examples fall at 
its edges. Section I(B) describes a class of zones—special 
economic zones—that do not so much import international law 
as simply let the default level for customs, duties, and taxes 
revert to their default level—zero—in the absence of a nation 
state. Section I(C)’s topic, the duty-free retail area, likewise 
serves the international community by setting certain parts of a 
nation state’s territory beyond the reach of its powers. 
Pre-asylum waiting areas, discussed in Section I(D), do the 
opposite; they leave some of a nation state’s territory or guests 
within the reach of its power, but outside the comfort of its 
rights and privileges. In these areas, the chaos of international 
human migration smashes into the hard edges of state power. 
These, too, represent special international zones of a type—a 
distinctly dystopian one. Ending this survey of SIZs on a lighter 
note, Section I(E) offers a collection of other interesting species 
in the genus. 
A. International Transit Zones 
International transit zones ease the transition between a 
host state’s territory and the places beyond, including the 
territories of other sovereigns and the ungoverned international 
commons of the sea and sky. The zone turns the border from a 
thin, solid line into a thick, complex, modulated buffer.14 So far as 
passengers and their luggage are concerned, international transit 
zones typically extend from the point of departure from the craft 
arriving from abroad—the exit door of a foreign airplane, for 
instance—to the inside border of immigrations and customs 
control. They ease international transit by allowing passengers to 
touch down on the host’s territory without passing through 
 
 14 See generally Jean-Baptiste Frétigny, Air Travel Opens New Understanding of 
Borders: The Case of Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, ANNALES DE GEOGRAPHIE 1, 5 
(2014), http://www.academia.edu/12970808/Air_Travel_Opens_New_Understanding_of_ 
Borders_ The_Case_of_Paris_Charles_de_Gaulle_Airport.  
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customs and immigration controls. Though it arises more as a 
gap between borders than as an entity unto itself, the 
international transit zones satisfies the definition of SIZ 
above: “An area that its host nation state places outside of its 
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving other such 
laws and applicable international obligations in force.”15 
Like all SIZs, international transit zones come into being by 
the choice of the local sovereign, which withdraws the effective 
reach of otherwise applicable laws relating to customs, duties, 
and immigration. Still other local laws, such as those forbidding 
trafficking in forbidden drugs, remain in force. In almost all 
cases (because almost all countries have joined it), the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (aka Chicago 
Convention) requires that an airport treat transiting craft as if in 
a customs and duty-free area.16 In other cases, such as in 
implementing the special privileges shared by travelers among 
Schengen Area countries, airports in particular countries may 
configure their international transit zones to favor certain trips 
or travelers.17 
In addition to serving the quotidian needs of typical 
travelers, international transit zones have won a storied place in 
diplomatic relations by serving as temporary (and sometimes not 
so temporary) holding pens for people caught between being 
arrested at home and becoming a political problem abroad.18 
Consider the case of Eric Snowden. Offered shelter of sorts by 
Russian authorities, who evidently sympathized with his crusade 
against elements of the United States government, he was 
allegedly housed in the international transit zone of Moscow’s 
Sheremetyevo International Airport; or perhaps, in a move akin 
to that used by France to justify scattering zones d’attente across 
its territory, in a more comfortable location nearby temporarily 
designated as extra-territorial by the Russians in pursuance 
of their campaign to irk the Americans.19 But more on that 
ploy anon.20 
 
 15 See supra Introduction. 
 16 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 24, Dec. 7, 1944. 
 17 Frétigny, supra note 14, at 13–15. 
 18 Mehran Karimi Nasseri, an Iranian refugee, lived within the international transit 
area of Terminal 1 at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport from 1988 to 2006. See Frétigny, 
supra note 14, at 21. 
 19 Brian Palmer, What’s Life Like in an Airport Transit Zone?, SLATE (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/07/edward_snowden_has_spen
t_a_week_in_a_transit_zone_at_moscow_s_airport_what.html [http://perma.cc/CZ8G-QC9V]. 
 20 See infra Section I(D). 
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B. SEZs and Related Special Jurisdictions 
The World Bank defines SEZs as “demarcated geographic 
areas contained within a country’s national boundaries where the 
rules of business are different from those that prevail in the 
national territory.”21 Through SEZs, in other words, a host offers 
a haven from the status quo that prevails elsewhere in the 
national territory. As such, SEZs represent a kind of special 
international zone—one wherein the host country rolls back the 
scope of customs, duties, taxes, and other select impediments to 
commerce, leaving in their place nothing but lots of freedom on a 
thin layer of international law. 
SEZs come in many types, including free trade zones, export 
processing zones, and wide-area hybrid export processing zone 
freeports.22 They come in many sizes, too, ranging from a portion 
of a single factory to metropolitan areas housing millions.23 
Though not SEZs in the modern sense, areas governed by special 
rules have existed almost as long as government itself. SEZs 
proper have enjoyed special vigor in recent decades.24 
To better understand how SEZs as a class qualify as a kind 
of special international zone, consider the Foreign Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”), which are popular in the United States.25 FTZs lay 
within the country’s borders geographically speaking, but “are 
treated for purposes of the tariff laws and customs entry 
procedures as being outside the customs territory of the United 
States.”26 The board charged with administering the zones thus 
considers them “outside the customs territory of the United 
States for the purposes of duty payment.”27 
By design, being outside the customs and excise taxes area of 
the United States offers a considerable inducement to 
transshipment and import-export processing services. Other 
benefits follow from the extra-territorial status of FTZs, too. If a 
 
 21 Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: 
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 (Thomas Farole & 
Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011) (quoting Claude Baissac, Brief History of SEZs and Overview of 
Policy Debates, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND 
LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 23 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011)). 
 22 Id. at 2. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION STATE TO 
STATELESS NATIONS 19–27 (2018). 
 25 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a–81u (2016); Regulations of the 
Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 15 C.F.R. § 400 (2018). Section 81c(a) distinguishes between 
FTZs and the customs territory of the United States. 
 26 Scope, 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (2018). 
 27 Preface to FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FOREIGN-
TRADE ZONES BOARD TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2016). 
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processor in the zone works imported materials into goods 
destined for the United States proper, the processor can choose to 
have the requisite duties assessed on either the value of the 
materials as imported or the value of the finished goods that 
include them—a useful option for accounting reasons.28 
Merchandise brought into a zone for shipment abroad can be 
counted as exported immediately, before it physically leaves the 
United States, for purposes of federal excise taxes and 
drawbacks.29 Also, consistent with the notion that in a federal 
system, no individual state can have a territory greater than the 
United States to which it belongs, personal property stored in the 
zone falls outside the scope of state and local ad valorem taxes.30 
By withdrawing the reach of select federal and state laws 
back from the border of FTZs, the United States effectively 
cedes governance of such matters to international law, such as 
it is in these matters. And in the sorts of matters that concern 
FTZs—customs and taxes—international law mostly is not. As 
with the duty-free zones discussed next, in other words, FTZs 
represent special areas where international rather than local 
law has real effect. 
C. Duty-Free Retail Areas 
A duty-free retail area functions as if it were outside the tax 
area of its host country for a select few people: passengers leaving 
for abroad. It allows them to purchase certain goods—typically, 
luxury ones such as liquor, cigarettes, or perfume—on condition 
that they immediately remove them from the host’s tax territory. 
The law of the United States, for instance, defines a duty-free 
retailer as “a person that sells, for use outside the customs 
territory, duty-free merchandise that is delivered from a bonded 
warehouse to an airport or other exit point for exportation by, or 
on behalf of, individuals departing from the customs territory.”31  
Duty-free retail areas are thus defined not only by limits on 
a map, but also limits on behavior. Which transactions classify as 
“duty-free” depends not merely on where they happen, but also 
on the intent of the purchaser. More generally than that, with the 
advent of market-defined “Traveler Spaces” catering solely to the 
needs of ticket-bearing passengers passing through international 
transit zones and “duty-free prices” outside such zones designed to 
 
 28 William G. Kanellis, Comment, Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones Board: 
Making Foreign Trade Zone Decisions Reflect the Legislative Intent of the Foreign Trade 
Zones Act of 1934, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 606, 618 (1995). 
 29 Id. at 618–19. 
 30 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81o(e) (2016). 
 31 19 U.S.C. § 1555(b)(8)(D) (2016). 
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simulate the financial experience of shopping within them, 
duty-free retail areas have come to symbolize places freed from the 
usual, mundane social obligations.32 
The ready availability of cut-priced alcohol, cigarettes, and 
luxury goods drives home the point: duty-free retail areas 
offer special zones beyond merely parochial local regulations. 
Duty-free zones belong in “an in-between space, global in 
dimension, whose strategies of appropriation are at odds with 
those of the nation states.”33 Duty-free retail areas operate not so 
much as a space on a map, or even as a label for some people, but 
as an idealized special international zone, where nation states 
withdraw their impositions, and the bland nothing of the 
ungoverned commons allows as much trade in rich and 
intoxicating goods as the market will bear.  
D. Pre-Asylum Waiting Areas 
As related in the Introduction above, France created an 
innovative new kind of SIZ—zones d’attente—by placing areas 
within the geographic boundaries of the country outside of its 
territory for immigration and asylum purposes.34 This new kind 
of SIZ began within Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport in 1992, 
but quickly multiplied across France, growing in size and 
number, and mutating into floating and temporary forms.35 From 
France, pre-asylum waiting areas spread to other countries.36 
They now represent a routine matter of local law, used across the 
world, usually without much note, as one of several mechanisms 
that nation states use to manage the flow of refugees, economic 
migrants, and other wandering people.37 
Why did the French create zones d’attente? Because, like 
other signatories to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”), it has promised to 
give refugees within its territory a variety of rights and 
privileges.38 France has bound itself to allow guest refugees to 
practice their religion, receive identity papers, and travel freely 
throughout the country.39 Most significantly, the convention 
forbids France, like other contracting parties, from expelling or 
 
 32 Frétigny, supra note 14, at 22. 
 33 Id. at 25. 
 34 See supra Introduction. 
 35 CESEDA art. L221-2. 
 36 Basaran, supra note 6, at 64. 
 37 See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 8. 
 38 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Introduction to CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2010) [hereinafter REFUGEE CONVENTION]. 
 39 Id. at 17, 28–29. 
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returning refugees to the country’s borders if to do so would put 
his or her life or liberty at risk for certain reasons, such as on 
account of race, religion, or social group.40 France doubts that the 
economic migrants showing up at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle and 
its other ports of entry qualify as “refugees” for purposes of the 
Refugee Convention, but if they can make it onto French 
territory, they can make a play for the status, thus winning at 
least temporary admittance (which by dint of flight often 
becomes de facto but illegal permanent admittance). France thus 
created the zones d’attente to, in effect, push back the border of 
its territory for purposes of those seeking asylum under the 
Refugee Convention.41 
How did the French create the zone d’attente? The applicable 
provision of the civil code begins by giving the zone tightly 
defined boundaries, saying it “extends from embarkation and 
disembarkation points to where immigration checks are carried 
out.”42 From there, though, the lines quickly get broader and 
blurrier. The zone may also include, “in transit areas or near 
the railway station, port, or airport, or near the place of 
disembarkation, one or more places of accommodation providing 
the concerned foreigners with hotel-type services.”43 
The zone d’attente can thus grow within the boundaries of 
the existing international transit zone. The largest of France’s 
immigration detention centers is located next to the runways of 
Roissy-Charles de Gaulle, for instance, ensuring that those 
housed in the zone receive frequent and unpleasant reminders of 
their tenuous status in the country.44 Given that they arise by 
mere administrative fiat, a zone d’attente could also be added to 
the edges of an existing international zone, making up a larger 
complex of associated but distinct SIZs.45 The French have done 
far more than that, though. 
The civil code also stretches the zone d’attente to any place 
the unwanted alien must go for administrative procedures, such 
as to attend an off-site asylum hearing or “in case of medical 
necessity.”46 Through that provision, the French can justify their 
 
 40 Id. at 30. 
 41 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 56–59. 
 42 CESEDA art. L221-2. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Morgane Iserte, Enquête en « zone d'attente réservée » de l'aéroport de Paris-
Charles de Gaulle: vers une gestion sécuritaire des « flux migratoires » [Investigation into 
“Waiting Area” of Paris-Charles de Gaulle], 71 CULTURES & CONFLICT 31, 33 (2008). 
 45 CESEDA art. L221-2. The article's first line gives power to set the zone's 
boundaries to “the competent administrative authority.” 
 46 Id. 
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use of floating and temporary zones. The creativity of French 
lawyers does not end there, however. The code even provides for 
the creation of a retroactive temporary zone d’attente that runs 
from where and when any group of ten or more foreigners has 
arrived in France from outside a border crossing to where they 
are discovered, up to twenty-six days later.47  
Commentators have not always treated the French zones 
d’attente with the highest regard, calling them fictional, illegal, 
and illiberal. This article reviews those critiques below.48 
Regardless of such theoretical musings, though, the zones 
d’attente did and do exist. Indeed, they have been booming. 
Courts have shaped the operations of zones d’attente, as 
when the European Court of Human Rights held that France 
could not detain foreigners without counsel indefinitely.49 This 
commentary and judicial guidance operates only at the edges, 
though. These sorts of pre-asylum waiting areas, because they 
help nation states regulate the flow of refugees, economic 
migrants, and other wandering people, will not go away any time 
soon. Whether called migration zones, excised territories, 
reception areas, transit areas, or detention areas, these SIZs will 
play a continuing and important role in international law.50  
D. Other Special International Zones 
This Section reviews some other special international zones. 
It offers only a small sample of what a more complete catalog 
might include: SIZs ranging from ancient sanctuaries to nascent 
block chain governments, with references to the many privileges 
traditionally associated with diplomatic personnel, friendly 
foreign military forces, and non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”).51 The examples could include SIZs as well known as 
the United Nations’ headquarters,52 or as obscure as Canada’s 
temporary surrender of sovereignty to aid the birth of a princess 
in exile.53 The “other” SIZs reviewed here: CERN and the special 
administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
 
 47 Id. France is not alone in retroactively creating pre-asylum waiting areas. See 
BASARAN, supra note 3, at 91 (discussing Australian retrospective regulations). 
 48 See infra Part II. 
 49 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826. 
 50 Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048–49; Basaran, supra note 6, at 64.  
 51 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66. 
 52 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 350 (1950) (describing the origins and effects of UN's 
“headquarters district”). 
 53 Netherlands’ Princess Margriet born in Ottawa, RADIO CANADA (Jan. 23, 1992), 
http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1403696302 (recounting that in 1940, Canada temporarily 
withdrew sovereignty over an Ottawa hospital room in order to ensure that the birth of 
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1. CERN 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research, better 
known as “CERN” from the acronym for its French name, the 
“Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire,” offers a notable 
example of how an international zone can create a safe space for 
large scale investment, research, and development. CERN enjoys 
a special status in the laws of the member countries that 
together created and fund it. This status, set forth in the Protocol 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Organization 
for Nuclear Research (“Protocol”), exempts CERN’s property, 
officials, and the family of CERN officials from customs, duties, 
national taxes, and visa restrictions.54 This has the practical 
effect of placing CERN properties, papers, and people in a sort of 
special international zone. 
Territory under the reach of particular national laws seem to 
pull back where CERN touches down. The Protocol provides that 
CERN’s real property—its grounds, buildings, and other 
structures—“shall be inviolable” against the authority of any 
“agent of the public authorities,” who may enter only with “the 
express consent of the Director-General or his duly authorized 
representative.”55 The organization, its property, its income, and 
its imports and exports escape national taxation, duties, or 
similar fees.56 The Protocol thus defines CERN’s special 
international zone in both territorial and functional terms. 
Although the Protocol reserves most of its benefits to CERN 
“officials,” it defines that term broadly enough to cover a wide 
range of employees, including “‘members of personnel’ as defined 
in the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Organization.”57 These 
people must pay a sort of internal tax “for the benefit of the 
Organization,” but the salaries and emoluments they get from 
the Organization remain “exempt from national income tax” 
under the Protocol.58 In practice, therefore, most CERN 
employment falls outside of any nation’s tax territory. 
 
the Netherlands’ Princess Margriet there to her family in exile would not take place 
under the cloud of a foreign flag, which might otherwise threaten her claim to royal 
succession). 
 54 PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION 
FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH (Mar. 18, 2004), http://cds.cern.ch/record/1035110/files/cer-
002693576.pdf [http://perma.cc/RVV4-S7UU]. 
 55 Id. at art. 3(1), (2). 
 56 Id. at art. 6. Note, however, that this exemption does not extend to “the purchase 
or use of goods or services or the import of goods intended for the personal use” of those 
working for CERN. Id. 
 57 Id. at art. 1(d). 
 58 Id. at art. 10(2)(b)(i). 
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CERN employment and residency falls outside of any 
member country’s legal territory, too. CERN officials enjoy “for 
themselves and the family members forming part of their 
household, the same exemption from immigration restrictions 
and aliens’ registration formalities as are normally granted to 
officials of international organizations.”59 The Protocol renders 
Organization officials exempt “from all compulsory contributions 
to national social security schemes, on the understanding that 
such persons are provided with equivalent social protection” 
by CERN.60 
The Protocol even puts CERN outside the justice systems of 
its member countries. As befits an international organization, the 
Protocol makes careful provision for the resolution of CERN’s 
disputes in forums, such as in private arbitrations, that remain 
outside the control of any one country.61 It could hardly be 
otherwise, given the high stakes at issue—CERN’s cross-border 
Large Hadron Collider cost almost U.S. $4.4 billion to build—and 
the many national interests affected.62 
Taken together, these provisions have the practical effect of 
putting CERN property, papers, and personnel in a special 
international zone. As in a French zone d’attente, these exemptions 
apply only to certain activities and people. A CERN SIZ lies 
outside not all national boundaries, but only the boundaries of 
select customs, taxes, and visa laws. And like a French zone 
d’attente, the status of a CERN SIZ can attach to particular 
people, creating floating personal temporary microzones that 
follow covered individuals even outside of the zone.63 
2. Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau 
Thanks to the history of European colonialism and the 
vagaries of fate, the People’s Republic of China has adopted a 
policy of “one country, two systems” with regard to both Hong 
Kong and Macau, allowing each to exist within China’s national 
territory as a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) with some, 
 
 59 Id. at art. 10(2)(c).  
 60 Id. at art. 11. 
 61 Id. at arts. 16–19. 
 62 CERN, LARGE HADRON COLLIDER THE GUIDE 17 (2017), http://cds.cern.ch/ 
record/2255762/files/CERN-Brochure-2017-002-Eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZK8-HX99] (listing 
total price of LHC of 4.332 billion Swiss francs). 
 63 Appropriately enough, given its innovations with other sorts of SIZs, France had a 
central role in the creation of CERN; the Convention forming it was written in Paris and 
signed by France, naturellement. See The European Organization for Nuclear Research is 
born, CERN, https://timeline.web.cern.ch/events/the-european-organization-for-nuclear-
research-is-born [http://perma.cc/YL2W-6BQT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
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but not all, attributes of sovereignty.64 This policy, embodied in a 
Basic Law adopted to govern each region upon its handover from 
European powers to Chinese powers in the late 1990s, allows 
Hong Kong and Macau responsibility over each of their local 
customs,65 taxes,66 immigration,67 labor,68 and other areas of law 
traditionally the sole province of a national government. These 
SARs exist in a bubble of sorts—within the national Chinese 
territory but without the legal territory of Chinese customs, 
taxes, etc. 
This special international zone is not, however, outside the 
reach of all Chinese laws. When the law concerns matters closer 
to the core of Chinese authority and pride, such as pertaining to 
the applicability of international agreements,69 the supremacy of 
the national constitution,70 or the adoption of flags and related 
symbols,71 the SAR’s autonomy ends. Here, the national and legal 
borders of China coincide, and the SARs exist in the same 
territory(ies) as other parts of China. 
In a functional sense, the Hong Kong and Macau SARs fit 
the definition of special international zone set forth above. Both 
have been placed by China outside its territory for the purpose of 
some laws, leaving other Chinese laws and applicable 
international obligations in force. Granted, the peculiar 
circumstances surrounding the origins of those SARs makes 
them very special kinds of SIZs. The colonial powers that China 
convinced to peacefully abandon all claims to Hong Kong and 
Macau, England and Portugal, respectively, did so only under the 
promise that the newly formed SARs would enjoy considerable 
autonomy. Query, therefore, if China ever had full title to the 
powers hypothetically transferred. Did China withdraw its legal 
territory from Hong Kong and Macau? Or did China decline to 
fully expand to the SARs sovereign powers it enjoyed in adjoining 
territories? In either event, Hong Kong and Macau offer 
examples of a host country designating part of its territory as 
beyond the reach of select national laws and leaving room for 
 
 64 See THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_ 
full_text_en.pdf [hereinafter HONG KONG BASIC LAW]; MACAU BASIC LAW pmbl., 
http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/pre.html. 
 65 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 116; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 112. 
 66 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 106, 108; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 104, 106. 
 67 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 154; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 139. 
 68 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 147; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 115. 
 69 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 153; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 138. 
 70 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 11; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 11. 
 71 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 10; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 10. 
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international principles—here, those of a more cosmopolitan and 
liberal world—to have effect. 
II. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN THEORY 
As documented above, special international zones have long 
operated, in many guises, all across the globe, without much 
incident. The SIZ has not, however, been subject to much 
consideration as a theoretical object itself. Has it perhaps been so 
ubiquitous as to escape notice? 
Nation states have, after all, long relied on an intrinsic power 
to reshape their interior borders as each alone sees fit. As Tugba 
Basaran observes, “[t]he distinction between physical presence 
and legal presence is not a new invention used for migration 
controls only, but relies on historical precedents in different 
contexts.”72 Citing ancient examples such as ancient sanctuaries 
from prosecution, the special privileges of ambassadors, military 
personnel deployed abroad, NGOs, and modern inventions such 
as special economic zones, Basaran concludes that “[t]he creation 
of outside spaces on the territory of the host state, placed under 
an international or foreign legal jurisdiction, and thus not part of 
domestic law, is an old technique.”73 
In recent years, however, the advent of zones d’attente and 
similar pre-asylum waiting areas has raised concerns that nation 
states might be using SIZs not simply to reshape the scope of 
domestic law, but to evade the obligations of international law. 
This, in turn, has made the theoretical status of SIZs a pressing 
matter. Hence this Part. Section II(A) relates the predominant 
critiques of SIZs qua pre-asylum waiting areas: that they are 
legal fictions, illegal, or illiberal. Section II(B) offers a way to 
redeem SIZs in terms of theory, as refuges free from the 
constraining effects of some domestic laws on the one side and 
governed by principles of international liberty on the other. If 
built to those specifications, (which admittedly cannot always be 
said of pre-asylum waiting areas) SIZs fit nicely within the 
existing theoretical framework, both positive and normative, of 
international law. 
A. Zones as Fictional, Illegal, and/or Illiberal 
Although for the most part SIZs quietly regulate the flow of 
international trade, travel, and cultural exchange without 
incident, zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas have 
 
 72 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66. 
 73 Id. 
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drawn withering criticism. James C. Hathaway calls pre-asylum 
areas “[a] particularly insidious mechanism”74 and “a legal 
ruse”75 used by France and other nation states to avoid their 
international obligations to refugees.76 Other commentators call 
it “a fiction,”77 “legal fiction,”78 “arbitrary,”79 or, perhaps most 
tellingly, as “places of illiberal practices.”80 Such critiques speak 
too broadly, insofar as they condemn all SIZs, but justly target 
the growing practice of nation states rolling back the borders of 
local laws and protecting individual rights and privileges while 
leaving in place local police, security, and penal laws. 
Why do commentators direct such ire at pre-asylum waiting 
areas? Because nation states arguably use them as a subterfuge 
to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention.81 That international agreement has proven very 
popular on paper; 146 countries have signed, including those now 
hosting various sorts of pre-asylum waiting zones.82 In so doing, 
each promised to afford several rights to refugees who find 
themselves “in” or “within” the contracting state’s territory.83 
And while no country is legally required to admit refugees, 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention says, “[n]o Contracting State 
shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”84 
Commentators argue that member countries violate this 
principle of non-refoulement when they use pre-asylum waiting 
areas to “expel or return” refugees “to the frontiers of territories” 
where the enumerated threats await. Hathaway, for example, 
after dismissing the zones d’attente as “a legal ruse” and citing 
the seminal European Court of Human Rights case, Amuur v. 
 
 74 HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 298. 
 75 Id. at 321. 
 76 Id. at 298, 321. 
 77 Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048. 
 78 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOST IN TRANSIT: INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR 
UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILDREN AT ROISSY CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT 5 (2009); see 
also Lydia Gall, Dispatches: Asylum Seekers Stuck Outside Transit Zones in Hungary, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 4, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/04/ 
dispatches-asylum-seekers-stuck-outside-transit-zones-hungary. 
 79 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 5. 
 80 Basaran, supra note 6, at 70. 
 81 See generally REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38. 
 82 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ch. 5, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 83 See REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 17 (guaranteeing religion); id. at 28 
(art. 27 guaranteeing issuance of identity papers); id. at 29 (art. 31(1)–(2) guaranteeing 
“non-penalization for illegal entry or presence” and movements of refugees within country 
of refuge).  
 84 REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 30. 
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France, as authority, summarily concludes: “There is thus no 
international legal difference between opting not to consider the 
refugee status of persons present in ‘international zones’ or 
‘excised territory’ and refusing to consider the refugee status of 
persons clearly acknowledged to be on the state’s territory.”85 
Human Rights Watch uses the same quick two-step citing Amuur 
and other cases in support of the claim that such zones represent 
nothing more than legal fictions used to hide violations of 
migrants’ rights.86 
The Amuur court gave these critics an irresistibly good 
quote: “[d]espite its name, the international zone does not have 
extraterritorial status.”87 In truth, however, like any holding, the 
effect of Amuur’s words can reach no farther than the underlying 
controversy allows. The dispute turned on application of Article 
5, section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a 
provision directed at preventing wrongful detention. Specifically, 
the court held that for France to hold the applicants in the zone 
d’attente for twenty days “under strict and constant police 
surveillance,” and without any “legal and social assistance,” 
wrongfully deprived the applicants of their liberty.88 
The Amuur court thus did not speak so boldly as its 
oft-quoted words might suggest. Instead of ruling all 
extraterritorial zones legal nullities—an issue not before the 
court and quite beyond its power to decide—the court ruled only 
that France had operated its zone d’attente in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.89 That much should 
prove unremarkable. 
The court did notand indeed could notforbid France from 
drawing its territorial borders in ways that impact only local law, 
or that leave its international obligations unimpeached. As proof 
of the opinion’s limited effect, France responded to Amuur and 
similar judicial corrections, not by abandoning its use of 
extra-territorial areas, but by amending and expanding the use 
of zones d’attente.90 
Calling pre-asylum waiting zones “fictional” does not change 
their very real impact. Calling the operation of such zones “illegal” 
may or may not have an effect, as indicated by (sometimes) 
 
 85 HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 321–22. 
 86 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 9–10. 
 87 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 851. 
 88 Id. at 848–49. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Gebremedhin v. France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 174, 178 (holding that lack 
of a suspensive clause in appeals from denials of asylum violates the Refugees 
Convention). 
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successful litigation.91 But what about calling pre-asylum waiting 
zones “illiberal” (in the sense of “liberty-violating” rather than 
of “leftist”)? 
That is the concern voiced by Tugba Basaran, who argues 
that through such devices, “liberal states can deny to particular 
populations fundamental rights, which are the normative and 
legal foundation of liberal states, whilst continuing to control 
the very same space through policing powers.”92 Contrary to 
commentators who view zones d’attente as fictional or per 
se illegal, Basaran sees them as alarmingly mundane tools of 
contemporary governance. “Border zones are legal constructions 
and law is an ordinary means by which the liberal state 
legitimizes illiberal practices.”93 
On that view, at least in the guise of pre-asylum waiting 
zones, SIZs allow nation states to roll back human rights while 
leaving police powers in place. Indeed, in actual practice, most 
hosts not only leave police powers in place, but considerably 
augment them, surrounding the zones with fences and walls, 
placing them under close observation, and creating an overall 
experience, from the point of view of detainees and those tasked 
to guard them, not far removed from a prison.94 The worst of 
these pre-asylum waiting areas has, by credible accounts, added 
not just detention, but punishment to the mix, offered in the form 
of ad hoc abuse dished out by overburdened border officials.95 
Sadly, but unsurprisingly, children have fared especially badly 
when foreign migration flows have run into modern machinery of 
border control.96 It offers scant consolation to the detainees 
caught within such zones that they can exit back to the countries 
from which they fled.97 
 
 91 For an example of unsuccessful litigation against the operation of a pre-asylum 
waiting area, see Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria, 2005-XIII HRDC 289, 300, which held 
that a three-day wait in an international transit zone at Vienna International Airport, 
pending consideration of asylum claim, did not constitute unlawful deprivation of liberty. 
 92 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 93 Id. at 7. 
 94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 16, 42; see also Clémence Richard & 
Nicolas Fischer, A Legal Disgrace? The Retention of Deported Migrants in Contemporary 
France, 47 SOC. SCI. INFO. 581, 594–95 (2008); see also Julien-Lafferrière, supra note 5. 
 95 Sonia Wolf, Illegal Immigrants Suffer Beatings, Humiliation at Paris Airport: 
Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-ENGLISH 1 (Dec. 16, 2003). 
 96 See Kim Willsher, Boy of eight held at Paris airport for more than a week, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2016, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/ 
boy-of-eight-held-at-paris-airport-for-more-than-a-week [http://perma.cc/QW5Y-RH94]; 
France: Unaccompanied Children Detained at Borders, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 8, 
2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/08/france-unaccompanied-children-
detained-borders [http://perma.cc/HFK9-V6JM]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78. 
 97 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 849–50. 
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The fractured nature of pre-asylum waiting areas abets their 
use as instruments of illiberal government. They pop into 
existence and disappear again, even appearing retroactively, at 
the whim of mere administrators. They split like amoeba and 
wiggle away in the form of floating and temporary zones. At the 
farthest extreme, pre-asylum waiting areas become little more 
than labels reading “unwelcome foreigner” attached to entire 
populations in the form of myriad floating personal temporary 
micro-zones. Far from a legal fiction, that describes how zones 
d’attente function quite realistically.98 It may, however, qualify as 
a legal absurdity. 
It arguably mocks the meaning of “international” to call 
these kinds of zones “SIZs.” Rather than areas between nation 
states, pre-asylum waiting areas represent areas more fully 
national and statist than anywhere else on earth. In them, the 
softening graces of liberal government—its respect for human 
dignity and its adherence to the rules of law—draw back, leaving 
nothing but brute force. 
On the charge of illiberality, then, the critics of zones 
d’attente and similar pre-asylum zones lay a telling blow. Done 
wrong, SIZs could allow nation states to violate their obligations 
to human rights, the international community, and their own 
citizens. How can theory set SIZs right? The next Section 
suggests keeping the “international” in SIZ by ensuring that they 
continue to promote free travel, trade, and cultural exchange. 
B. Zones as Liberal International Refuges 
The prior Section reviewed the theoretical critiques against 
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas and found 
one in particular especially telling: Such zones can serve as 
instruments through which supposedly liberal states enforce 
illiberal policies. This danger arises not only because nation 
states find it expedient to shrink the effective territory of the 
liberties and privileges they uphold while leaving the reach of 
their police powers undiminished, but also because international 
law has relatively little force to compel nation states to treat 
foreigners more respectfully in special international areas. 
Transit zones, SEZs, duty-free areas, and other SIZs typically 
serve those aims in practice, of course. As yet, though, theory has 
little to say about the matter. This Section begins filling that gap 
by justifying special international zones not simply as 
expressions of local power, but also as institutions that the 
 
 98 See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 54. 
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community of nations accepts and respects as instruments for 
promoting freedom of travel, trade, and cultural exchange. 
It does not take much imagination to discern how SIZs could 
serve as refuges to those traditionally liberal values. All of the 
many types of SIZs reviewed above in Part I serve international 
trade, travel, and cultural exchange in various ways. Some do so 
obviously, as when international transit zones ease the passage 
of travelers through a country or when free ports encourage 
trade. Others do so indirectly, as when the Hong Kong and 
Macau SARs allow liberal values to subsist in a sea of nominal 
communism, or when, with the best of intentions but with mixed 
results, pre-asylum waiting areas attempt to impose a measure 
of order on the chaos of human migration. 
These innate virtues of SIZs remain as yet underappreciated 
as theoretical ideals. It could hardly be otherwise, given that only 
in this article has the SIZ itself emerged as worthy of study. 
Now, having identified it in the wild, so to speak, and come to 
understand its ways, we can turn to directing SIZs toward 
human ends. That exercise might begin by curbing mutations, 
such as zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas that, 
if unchecked, might remove whole regions and people from the 
liberality of the nation state, but not coercive grip. 
Again, it does not take much imagination to discern how to 
save SIZs from that fate. Activists, reporters, and scholars have 
brought the problem to the world’s attention. Amuur and other 
judicial correctives on the scope of police powers imposed within 
zones d’attente show international law working exactly as it 
should, albeit at its usual glacial pace.99 No theoretical discussion 
was needed to start that remedial process. Perhaps now it might 
contribute to the effort, however.  
As SIZs continue to grow, spread, and adapt in practice, our 
theories about SIZs must keep pace. It ill serves our 
understanding to dismiss them as fictional or illegal. SIZs are 
no less real than any social institution and have become a 
commonplace tool of international law. Good theory should 
recognize the full potential, good and bad, of special 
international zones. 
Illiberality is not built into the DNA of SIZs; quite the 
contrary. For the greatest part, during the long course of their 
history and throughout their many instantiations, SIZs have 
made international travel, trade, and cultural exchange more 
 
 99 See generally Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533 (1996); Gebremedhin v. 
France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131. 
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cheap, easy, and safe. In this capacity, they have served as 
powerful forces for peace, prosperity, and human freedom. 
Recognizing this theoretic ideal might make it easier to reform 
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas. It might 
also help when it comes to designing new SIZs—the topic of the 
next Part. 
III. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Having above described special international zones in 
practice and theory, this article now turns to questions of 
application. What might the next generation of SIZs bring? 
This Part offers four examples: refugee cities, deep blue zones, 
peer group country standards, and special international 
residency and work zones. The following Sections address each 
in turn, seriatim.  
A. Refugee Cities 
A select few policymakers and commentators have proposed 
creating zones designed to give displaced people a more 
appealing option than flinging themselves against the gates of 
unwelcoming countries. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier have 
called for the creation of special economic zones where refugees 
might find gainful employment relatively close to home, rather 
than in some far off European or North American country, 
without unduly disrupting the local labor markets of the host 
country.100 Refugee Cities, a 501(c)(3) public charity, proposes to 
help host countries and NGOs implement a similar policy.101  
Special refugee zones have already gotten a bit of traction in 
the real world. The EU has entered into a compact with Jordan 
under which productions from its SEZs will receive favored 
access to European markets on condition that Syrian refugees get 
to work alongside Jordanians (instead of, as is more typical of 
refugee populations, being barred from local labor markets).102 
That approach to aiding refugees has drawn criticism from 
human rights activists, however, and no other such projects 
appear in the offing.103 Perhaps would-be host countries worry 
 
 100 See ALEXANDER BETTS AND PAUL COLLIER, REFUGE: RETHINKING REFUGEE POLICY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 171–73 (2017). 
 101 REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org [http://perma.cc/AV7C-46WB] (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
 102 See European Union Press Release IP/16/588, Syrian Crisis: EU Ready to Step Up 
on Partnerships with Lebanon and Jordan (Oct. 17, 2016). 
 103 See Heaven Crawley, Why jobs in special economic zones won’t solve the 
problems facing the world’s refugees, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2017, 6:45 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/why-jobs-in-special-economic-zones-wont-solve-the-
problems-facing-the-worlds-refugees-75249 [http://perma.cc/SQK3-J6XX]. 
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about setting out to offer aid to those in need but ending up with 
unwanted residents and citizens. A properly structured SIZ could 
help fix that problem. 
Structuring a refugee camp as a special zone that lies 
outside the territory of its host country for purposes of many local 
laws, including for the purpose of establishing the privileges of 
residency or citizenship, would lower the risks of a host country 
taking in refugees and other wandering populations. That would 
make it easier for those suffering masses to find a place to rest. 
Absent binding international obligations to the contrary, a 
country should be able to create a SIZ outside of the host’s legal 
territory for some purposes, such as for establishing rights to 
residency or citizenship, without causing much of a diplomatic 
stir. As noted above, such devices have become routine in many 
contexts and countries.104 
Done right, and reported fairly, such a refugee SIZ program 
would likely win its host accolades. Who could complain if a 
country willing to let foreigners onto its territory as an act of 
humanitarian mercy, in response to an emergency situation, 
redrew its legal boundaries to withdraw the full panoply of its 
residents’ and citizens’ privileges and obligations from the foreign 
guests? All the many other countries unwilling to give shelter on 
better terms would, at any rate, have little grounds to criticize. 
This outline of a legal framework for refugee SIZs leaves 
many questions unanswered. Foremost among them: Would it be 
right for a country hosting a refugee SIZ to deny those taking 
shelter within the zone from free access to and from other 
international zones, traffic, and travelers? The French zones 
d’attente seem headed in that direction, but remain a lot more 
like prisons than areas where local law has given way to 
international norms. Tugba Basaran reports a trend toward 
greater access, but notes that French zones d’attente remain 
subject to strict limits, under which a few NGOs can access 
certain parts of the zones, and certain parties therein, subject to 
the unfettered discretion of the Minister of the Interior.105 
Another question worth asking: Conceding that a host 
country ought to have every right to deny a foreign sovereign the 
right to govern some or all of a refugee SIZ, can it rightly deny 
migrant people some form of self-government, if only that 
provided by an NGO, or church, or some other organization short 
of a competing sovereign nation? I should hope not, but should 
 
 104 See supra Part I. 
 105 See Basaran, supra note 8, at 350. 
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also confess to a partial view of such matters, given professional 
interests in the field.106 Refugee Cities seems to agree; it suggests 
that “a regional, supranational entity, such as the EU, or a 
collection of representatives from the host country and 
neighboring nations, could establish the regulatory authority” for 
the refugee cities it advocates.107 It also calls for giving the 
residents of refugee cities various ways to get involved in 
self-government.108 
Only time will tell what form refugee cities will take, and 
whether they will take form at all. Many other questions persist. 
The problems that inspire the idea of special international zones 
for refugees persist, too, though. Perhaps refugee cities, in some 
form, will help to abate them. 
B. Deep Blue Zone 
French Polynesia has invited Blue Frontiers Pte. Ltd. to 
submit plans for developing a new kind of special economic zone 
in that country—a “SeaZone” encompassing both land and 
water areas.109 The final legal structure of that special 
jurisdiction will depend on action by the National Assembly of 
French Polynesia. Even as a mere hypothetical, though, the 
SeaZone presents an interesting exercise for the application of 
the SIZ model. The seasteader’s unique situation—they seek 
little more from French Polynesia than a safe nursery where 
the first generation of their floating communities can grow 
and mature in anticipation of eventually moving to the high 
seas—calls for unique solutions.110 It calls, for reasons set forth 
in more detail earlier and elsewhere, for a unique kind of special 
international zone: a “‘deep blue’ zone.”111 
What is a deep blue zone? It takes its name from the 
prevailing color of the international waters of the planet, ocean 
areas shared by the vessels of all nations, under the exclusive 
control of none. The deep blue zone would recreate those areas in 
simulated form by offering close to shore many of the legal effects 
of staying far out at sea. 
 
 106 See BELL, supra note 24, at 219–33 (relating “stories of the sort ordinarily 
recounted over drinks” about the author’s consulting practice). 
 107 Governance, REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org/about-the-project/our-
response/governance/ [http://perma.cc/4FUN-YDKA] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
 108 Id. 
 109 BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2017). 
 110 See generally JOE QUIRK WITH PATRI FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING 
NATIONS WILL RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT, ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND 
LIBERATE HUMANITY FROM POLITICIANS (2017). 
 111 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63. 
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A deep blue SIZ would allow select foreign vessels to anchor 
within the territorial or inland waters of its host nation on 
terms designed to simulate those that apply in international 
waters. This would change the rule ordinarily applicable in 
territorial waters, wherein foreign vessels can typically do no 
more than maintain innocent passage.112 Because the host could 
fine-tune the zone’s rules to disallow military vessels, resource 
extraction, and other international rights ill-suited for inland 
waters, the deep blue zone need not pose any unusual risks. At 
the same time, the arrangement would give seasteaders a 
protected harbor, both literally and legally speaking, in which 
they could try out the arrangements they aim to someday use in 
international waters. 
If seasteaders make it out into the open ocean, for instance, 
as they so ardently claim to want, they will find themselves 
living in cities that, because they float in international waters, 
will enjoy ready access to the world’s maritime trade. Vessels 
flying the flags of many sovereigns will visit and trade with 
seasteads. Furthermore, the seasteaders’ vessels will themselves 
likely sport various flags, whether of nation states or, still more 
hypothetically, of seasteading polities.113 
Because each flag brings with it much of the substantive law 
of the flag’s issuer, rendering the vessel flying it national 
territory for some purposes,114 seasteads offer the prospect of 
bringing many various polities together in close proximity under 
fluid conditions. Just as the borders of ecosystems, such as where 
a river meets the ocean, generate the greatest diversity and 
growth, this polycentric feature of seasteads offers the prospect of 
untold wondersor chaos. Such complex systems do not always 
behave predictably. Through a deep blue SIZ, seasteaders might 
reduce the rough and tumble of international seas and laws to 
safe, controlled conditions. 
C. Peer Group Country Standards 
Special economic zones, for the most part, aim to offer little 
more than areas free of customs, duties, and taxes, sometimes 
with the added benefit of one-window service for any government 
paperwork that persists. Zones competing on those fronts need 
not reference the laws of other countries. Relatively recently, 
 
 112 See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
arts. 17–21. 
 113 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63 (discussing flagging options, including self-
flagging seasteads). 
 114 See id. at 62. 
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however, zones have begun to compete not only on the price and 
convenience of governing services, but also on the applicable 
rules.115 That opens the door for a zone that allows its guests to 
choose rule sets from any of a number of pre-approved countries, 
bringing international law to bear on what is ordinarily a purely 
local question. 
Though somewhat by historical accident rather than by 
Chinese design, Hong Kong demonstrated long ago that 
importing the right foreign laws to a special jurisdiction can help 
it thrive. First as a Crown Colony and then, under a “Basic Law” 
that maintained the legal system’s fundamental features after its 
handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong has succeeded by offering 
Asia a common law legal system relatively friendly to private 
enterprise and high finance.116 Eager to replicate that success, 
Dubai employed retired English judges, even fitting them out with 
robes and perukes, and wrote “the laws of England and Wales” 
into its legal system.117 Honduras plans to take the process even 
further with its zonas de empleo y desarrollo económico (“zones of 
employment and economic development” or “ZEDEs”), which 
within broad limits will allow each zone to import common law or 
other rules from public or private sources of its own choosing.118 
These trends suggest that a future special international zone 
might best satisfy the market demand for good rules not simply 
by offering another country’s laws within its bounds, as in Hong 
Kong or Dubai, nor even by offering a flag-free generic common 
law legal system, as Honduran ZEDEs might, but by offering a 
choice between any of the many rule sets that a variety of peer 
countries would apply to a particular area of regulation. The host 
would select the countries in its peer group on the basis of the 
quality of their regulations, market demand for them among zone 
clients, and their suitability given local conditions. A special zone 
set up in Central America might choose to put all OECD 
countries (thus including all members of EU and NAFTA) and its 
neighboring countries in its peer group, for example. With regard 
to some areas of regulation, guests could either stick with the 
regulatory scheme that applies by default in the zone (which 
 
 115 See BELL, supra note 24, at 187. 
 116 See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 273–77 (2004). 
 117 Law on the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws in the Dubai International 
Finance Center, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, art. 8(2)(e) (U.A.E.), https://www.difc.ae/files/92
14/5448/9184/Law_on_the_Application_of_Civil_and_Commercial_Laws_in_the_DIFC_DI
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 118 Decreto No. 120-1203, Ley Orgánica de las Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo 
Económico (ZEDE) [Organic Act for Zones for Employment and Economic Development 
(ZEDE)], LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL DEL LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS (Sept. 6, 2013). 
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might itself come from outside the host country) or choose one 
from a peer country. 
Under peer group standards, for example, if a company that 
manufactures and sells medical devices in the German market 
decides to expand its operations to the zone, it could choose to 
stick with the rules it has already mastered. The zone would not 
try to master those rules itself, but would instead require the 
company to certify that its practices in the zone, because they 
follow those established in its home country, comply with 
German law. This certification could be provided by the peer 
country itself under special arrangement or by some trusted 
third party. Upon offering its certification of compliance with 
peer group country standards, the company would be allowed to 
make and sell medical devices in the zone. 
Though companies would probably often want to “bring to 
the zone” the same regulations they have already satisfied back 
home, thus saving the need to master another set of rules, a 
company setting up in the zone could choose the regulations of 
any peer country. It may turn out, after all, that all medical 
device companies in the zone, even those from other countries, 
will want work under German regulations. 
In this way, a SIZ run on peer group standards could reveal 
which countries, among those trusted to have reasonably good 
rules, offer the sorts of regulations that protect the public while 
encouraging economic development. That in turn might 
encourage countries to compete for the coveted top spot in terms 
of trusted but efficient regulatory services. This is not just a 
matter of prestige, nor even of what revenue might be had from 
selling certification services to parties invoking a particular 
countries’ regulations within a zone that applies peer group 
country standards. The countries that take the lead in offering 
the world regulations that both protect the public while 
promoting profit will give its domestic industry a great 
advantage over foreign competitors, who instead of having 
already mastered the prevailing rules will have to either play 
catch up or suffer under the familiar but unpopular rules of their 
own home countries. 
D. Special International Residency and Work Zones 
Future SIZs could also take a form designed to attract digital 
nomads, voluntary exiles, and other parties eager to pay for 
enjoying lower barriers to international travel, trade, and 
cultural exchange. Enterprising host countries could serve that 
growing market by offering special international residency and 
work zones. This Section explains SIRW zones in greater detail. 
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In a SIRW zone, a nation state would roll back its customs 
and immigration border, legally speaking, and leave behind an 
area open to visitors, residents, and workers from abroad. Like 
French zones d’attente, these zones would begin as offshoots of 
a pre-existing international transit zone. The usual tourist and 
resident visa and work permit rules would not apply in a SIRW 
zone. Other rules might apply of course; that depends on the host 
government, the organization (probably private) that operates the 
zone, and the international market for places to live and work. 
Most likely, the SIRW zone would offer comfortable housing 
and work environments for all its guests and expedited processing 
of residency visas and work permits for those seeking stronger 
links to the host country. To judge from current practices in 
international transit zones, private parties will likely manage 
SIRW zones under the host’s oversight.119 Instead of applying its 
customs and immigration rules to the zone, the host would assess 
a flat lease, per capita, or other fee. This would ensure that the 
zone pays its way, in terms of public finances, while being treated 
as a black box by the host country in terms of the taxation of (and 
thus interference with) the zone’s internal operations. 
Extant SIZs have come close to creating SIRW zones without 
quite fulfilling all the criteria. Norway’s Svalbard Islands look like 
one at first glance. As its welcoming website says, “[e]veryone 
may, in principle, travel to Svalbard, and foreign citizens do not 
need a visa or a work or residence permit from Norwegian 
authorities in order to settle in Svalbard.”120 In contrast to the 
voluntary process through which host countries ordinarily create 
SIZs, however, Norway had to accept this limitation on its 
sovereignty somewhat by force. It never had the right to impose 
visa or work permit requirements in the islands, but rather had 
to foreswear imposing those limits on nationals of other parties 
to the Svalbard Treaty in order to win such control over the 
islands as it now claims.121 It bears noting, however, that the 
Governor of Svalbard, evidently not pressed for space, has 
extended the invitation to all foreigners.122 
Something akin to a SIRW zone also emerges from the 
details of the Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water 
Harbour and Industrial Area) Act, the legislative enactment of 
an agreement reached between the government and the private 
 
 119 See Frétigny, supra note 14, at 15–16; see also BASARAN, supra note 3, at 102–03. 
 120 Entry and Residence, THE GOVERNOR OF SVALBARD, https://www.sysselmannen.no/ 
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 121 The Svalbard Treaty art. 3, Feb. 9, 1920. 
 122 Entry and Residence, supra note 120. 
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developer of a free port.123 The Act gave a new corporation, the 
Grand Bahama Port Authority, Ltd., sweeping powers to create 
and run the port, including responsibility for education and 
healthcare, and exemptions from all manner of customs, duties, 
taxes, and fees.124 More to the point for present purposes, it also 
allowed the Port Authority (or its licensees) to bring to the 
Bahamas and employ a broadly defined class of skilled workers 
and their dependents, subject only to a government veto right 
against identified individuals.125 This is not quite a SIRW zone, 
but neither is it far from one. 
In its full flower, SIRW zones would offer something of a 
reflection of the pre-asylum waiting areas that France and other 
countries have created. Instead of trying to drive migrants away, 
a SIRW zone would try to convince them to come, stay, and work. 
Like pre-asylum waiting areas, though, SIRW zones would exist 
within a country’s geographic borders but outside of its territory, 
legally speaking, for purposes of customs or immigration. 
CONCLUSION: UNBUNDLING SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 
This article has introduced the special international 
zone—an area that its host nation state places outside of its 
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving other such 
laws and applicable international obligations in force—as a 
distinct genus of legal institution worthy of close study. As Part I 
documented, SIZs have a long history, already exist in great 
numbers across many types, and continue to grow and adapt. 
Their success should come as no surprise, given that SIZs prove 
so useful in helping smooth the barriers, gates, and gaps between 
nation states’ various territories. The theoretical foundations of 
SIZs have hitherto remained rather undeveloped, however. Part 
II began correcting that deficiency by defending SIZs as 
irreplaceable tools for promoting the liberal ideals embodied in 
free trade, travel, and cultural exchange. Part III applied that 
theoretical approach to SIZs by describing special international 
zones that might, if brought to fruition, promote peace, 
prosperity, and human dignity. 
Nation states usually follow the same business model as 
cable TV companies: bundle many various services into an 
indivisible whole. SIZs allow innovative nation states to offer 
 
 123 The Hawksbill Creek Agreement, GRAND BAH. PORT AUTH., http://www.gbpa.com/ 
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something like service à la carte. Whereas in most of its territory, 
a government offers a single package of services—taxes, 
regulations, policing, etc.—in a SIZ it can offer a curated 
selection of these. In an international transit zone, for instance, 
most of the usual laws apply with the exception of certain ones 
relating to immigration and taxes. A SIRW zone might remove 
labor regulations from the mix, too. A deep blue zone would 
remove still other local restrictions, leaving international norms 
to fill the gap. This, the power of special international zones to 
regulate the territorial boundaries of nation states, stands to 
work widespread and lasting changes on the structure of 
international relations. 
 
 
